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This paper examines whether multinational companies differ in their employment adjustment 
from domestic firms, on the basis of a panel of Belgian firms for the period 1997-2007. We focus on 
incumbent firms as, in general, they account for the largest fraction of net employment creation, 
especially among multinational firms (MNFs). We obtain structural estimates of adjustment cost 
parameters for blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, domestic firms, and MNFs. We find 
evidence of convex, asymmetric (in the sense that it is more expensive to downsize than to upsize) 
and cross adjustment costs (indicating costly substitution between workers). To adjust white-collar 
employment seems to be around half as costly for MNFs as for domestic firms. There is no 
difference between Belgian MNFs and foreign MNFs. A small fraction of the gap between the 
adjustment costs of MNFs and domestic firms may be explained by the use of fixed-term contracts 
and early retirement. Controlling for firm size does not yield robust conclusions; the cost advantage 
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1  Introduction 
  Multinational firms (hereafter MNFs) have played a growing role in the world economy over the 
last decades. Many governments devote substantial efforts to attracting foreign direct investment 
(hereafter FDI) to their country1 on the grounds that foreign MNFs are important employment 
providers. Belgium is no exception to this. This small country has long been very open to MNFs. In 
terms of inward FDI flows, expressed as a percentage of gross capital formation, Belgium (64%) 
ranks at the top among European Union countries (16%), and far above the United States (6%) 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Between 2003 and 2008, around 10,000 jobs were directly created each year by 
FDI in Belgium (IBM, 2009). MNFs, which are typically larger, may make a sizeable contribution to 
employment creation. However, the other side of the coin is that they can abruptly leave the local 
market and consequently destroy a substantial number of jobs. For example, the closure of the 
Belgian assembly line of a large car manufacturer in the nineties caused the destruction of about 
3,000 jobs.2 Actually, MNFs may have broader (international) scope than domestic firms in that 
respect. They may have an incentive to relocate their activities to another country where labour 
costs are lower, productivity is higher and/or local demand is increasing strongly. Low barriers to 
mobility facilitate the international relocation of the MNFs’ activities. In all, MNFs are commonly 
viewed as "footloose" or at least as having great flexibility in terms of international employment and 
plant management. 
The closure of firms by multinationals may be crucial for policy, especially for evaluating the 
relevance of government expenditure on attracting FDI. This explains the extensive literature 
focusing on the footloose nature of multinationals, or on ascertaining whether MNFs have a higher 
propensity to close plants and exit the domestic market than national firms (see, for example, 
Alvarez and Görg, 2009, Bernard and Jensen, 2007, Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003, Görg and 
Strobl 2003, and, for Belgium, Van Beveren, 2007). Two main findings can be drawn from this 
literature: (i) a simple frequency analysis indicates that MNFs exit less frequently than domestic 
firms; but (ii) the survival (exit) probability of MNFs is lower (greater) than that of domestic firms 
when one controls  for various characteristics such as size, age, sector and productivity. 
  The aim of this paper is to go beyond these views by assessing the main features of labour 
adjustment of MNFs in a small open economy. Employment adjustment is a more general process 
than plant closure or massive restructuring, as it also covers "business as usual" hiring and firing 
decisions of firms. The total impact of MNFs on employment growth must be viewed as the 
                                                       
1   This may include fiscal stabilisation measures such as rulings. Also, multinationals' financial centres, 
known as coordination centres, received favourable tax treatment, up to 2010. In addition, government 
investment in infrastructure as a complement to inward FDI, and subsidies (Haskel et al., 2007, report 
examples of subsidies in the US and the United Kingdom) may represent significant incentives for foreign 
investors. Also, in Belgium, governments have set up public agencies devoted to inward and outward FDI 
(see  invest.belgium.be and the websites of the regional authorities www.investinbrussels.com, 
www.investinflanders.be and www.investinwallonia.be). 
2   After the closure of this assembly line, a new law was passed obliging firms with 20 or more employees to 
inform their employees if they are planning mass redundancies or a plant closure. During the consultation 
period, the workers (or their representatives) can make counter-proposals or negotiate accompanying 
measures (training programmes, early retirement, redundancy pay). While such a law has little impact on 




outcome of two processes. Job creation and job destruction arise respectively when a firm is 
created or closed down. But incumbent firms also adjust their labour force in response to changes 
in demand and business conditions. 
  To assess the relative importance of job destruction caused by the closure of firms and 
employment adjustment by incumbent firms in total net job creation, we analyse net job creation 
along the lines of Davis et al. (1996). We conduct a first breakdown across incumbents and exiting 
firms and a second across domestic firms3 and MNFs, distinguishing between Belgian and foreign 
MNFs. Overall, we find that incumbent firms contribute substantially to net job variations. This 
result is still valid by type of firms. However, incumbent foreign MNFs make a bigger contribution to 
net employment flows than domestic firms. This suggests that there might be differences in labour 
adjustment costs between the two types of firms. 
  We therefore focus on employment adjustment by incumbent firms. More precisely, we 
investigate the difference in employment adjustment costs across MNFs and domestic firms. On 
the assumption that MNFs are potentially more flexible in their workforce management, we test 
whether the adjustment costs are lower for MNFs than for domestic firms. 
  Only very few papers have considered the distinction between the employment adjustment of 
MNFs and that of domestic companies. Navaretti et al. (2003) estimate a partial adjustment model 
of labour demand based on an unbalanced panel covering more than ten thousand companies 
located in eleven European countries, and observed over the period 1993-2000. They find that 
multinational companies adjust employment much faster than domestic firms, which may suggest 
lower adjustment costs for MNFs. 
  Why might labour adjustment be less costly for MNFs than for domestic firms? First, 
multinationals are typically large, and economies of scale in human resources management may 
decrease their adjustment costs and minimise labour indivisibility issues compared to smaller 
domestic firms. In this context, they may be more inclined to use more flexible forms of 
employment, such as fixed-term contracts and procedures that reduce downsizing costs. In 
Belgium, early retirement is a legal procedure that reduces restructuring costs compared to 
(collective) redundancies. Note that this applies to both domestic and foreign MNFs. Second, as 
shown by Haskel et al. (2007) on the basis of some typical examples, MNFs may have bargaining 
power with respect to (national or local) governments and unions, which may allow them to obtain 
temporary exceptions in regard to hiring and firing costs and practices. Third, national firms 
(domestic or multinational) may face additional constraints on their ability to severely downsize 
their labour force, such as special relationships with governmental authorities or consumer anger. 
Fourth, the (international) multi-plant nature of their activities allows MNFs to reallocate 
employment within an internal labour market across countries without formally firing employees and 
hiring new workers. Fifth, the structure of the workforce may also affect total adjustment costs. 
These are expected to be greater for highly skilled workers than for low skilled workers, and MNFs 
typically employ a larger percentage of highly skilled workers than domestic firms 
(Markusen, 2002). 
  Following the literature on labour adjustment costs, we estimate a dynamic labour demand 
equation from structural Euler equations. We estimate adjustment costs separately for blue-collar 
                                                       
3   We define domestic firms as companies with no foreign affiliates.  
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(or the equivalent non clerical) workers and white-collar (clerical) workers, to eliminate 
compositional effects when examining differences between MNFs and domestic firms. A flexible 
specification of adjustment costs is introduced, based on a polynomial approach initially proposed 
by Alonso-Borrego (1998). The adjustment cost function used allows for concave or convex 
adjustment costs and for asymmetries between upsizing and downsizing costs. We also allow for 
cross adjustment costs, i.e. adjustment costs related to one type of workers depending on 
adjustment of the other type of workers. 
  We then explore the role of various factors that may affect adjustment cost parameters, and in 
particular the difference between MNFs and domestic firms. We consider the nationality of the 
owner firm in order to capture differences in the constraints and bargaining power of foreign and 
national MNFs. Three proxies are introduced to take into account the scope of employment 
management. First, we consider a dummy for union representation, based on a minimum number 
of employees.4 It is expected to increase adjustment costs but possibly to a lesser extent for MNFs. 
Second, the share of fixed-term contracts, in either the labour force or staff turnover, is used as a 
measure of the firm's ability to apply flexible employment practices. Third, the use of early 
retirement procedures is considered as another proxy of flexible adjustment practices. The scope 
of the internal labour market of MNFs could be considered as an additional relevant factor. 
However, we cannot investigate this dimension because it would require data on the international 
network of foreign MNFs. Finally, we also control more directly for firm size by using a proportional 
cost model that is a generalisation of Meghir et al. (1996). 
The dynamic labour demand equations are estimated by System-GMM methods which yield 
consistent parameter estimates and deal with the weak instrument problem. To conduct our 
econometric analysis, we use firm-level panel data from the Belgian Foreign Direct Investment 
Survey matched with firms' annual and social reports over the period 1997-2007, and with firm-
level data of employment and remuneration by type of worker, from the Social Security Data 
Warehouse. 
Our results suggest that, for both types of workers and both types of firms, adjustment costs 
are convex and asymmetric in the sense that it is more expensive to downsize than to upsize. 
Furthermore, labour adjustment is less costly when adjustment is undertaken by changing the 
number of both blue-collar and white-collar workers in the same direction, but substitution between 
the two types of workers increases adjustment costs. 
MNFs face lower adjustment costs than domestic firms. More precisely, for non-clerical 
workers, the gap between downsizing costs and upsizing costs is equal to zero for MNFs and is 
positive for domestic firms. For clerical workers, adjustment costs are around half as much for 
MNFs as for domestic firms. 
Our results also indicate that when account is taken of the use of legal procedures to increase 
labour flexibility, i.e. the use of fixed term contracts and early retirement, the difference in 
adjustment costs of white-collar workers between MNFs and domestic firms still exists even though 
it is reduced. Conversely, we do not verify that - compared to domestic firms - MNFs have any 
                                                       
4   In Belgium, union representation is compulsory for firms with 50 employees and more. It also implies 
union participation in works councils, where consultation and negotiation between employers' and 
employees’ representatives take place.  
5 
 
particular additional bargaining power vis-à-vis unions. Finally, there are no differences in 
adjustment costs between Belgian and foreign MNFs. 
Regarding the impact of firm size, our results are less clear-cut. While controlling for this 
dimension reduces and in some cases offsets the adjustment cost advantage of MNFs, it actually 
becomes an adjustment cost disadvantage in some specifications. This clearly shows the limits of a 
variable that proxies for several (opposing) effects. 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 
reports evidence on net job creation, focusing on the relative contribution of incumbent firms and 
firm closures to employment flows. In Section 4, we derive Euler equations for labour inputs. We 
then report estimates of production function coefficients. We present estimates of labour 
adjustment costs. Finally, we investigate several explanations for the difference in adjustment costs 
between MNFs and domestic firms. Our main conclusions are summarised in Section 5. 
2  Construction of the dataset and variables 
  To conduct the various empirical analyses presented in the following section, we use a sample 
of multinational and domestic firms observed over the period 1997-2007. Our sample is obtained 
by merging three sources of information. The first is the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment, 
conducted by the National Bank of Belgium and covering the period 1997-2007. The second is the 
annual accounts of firms, collected for (nearly) all companies located in Belgium by the Central 
Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium. The third is the Social Security Data 
Warehouse, from which we obtain data on worker flows and workers’ remuneration, by worker type 
(blue and white-collar workers), for firms having at least 10 employees over the same period. We 
briefly present the construction of the dataset in this section. A detailed description is provided in 
Appendix A. 
  We restrict our analysis to firms with at least 10 employees that filed their annual accounts 
using the most detailed (full) format for at least one year during the period considered.5 We focus 
on manufacturing industries, construction, trade, market services and financial intermediation 
sectors (i.e. two-digit 2003 NACE-bel codes between 15 and 73). We exclude the sector "other 
business activities" (NACE code 74), which includes temporary employment agencies, because 
that could seriously bias the job flow estimates. We also restrict our sample to "profit maximising" 
firms, defined according to their legal form, e.g. we exclude non profit associations and public 
utilities. 
  We construct variables based on the main balance sheet items such as total assets, value 
added, and the capital stock (measured as the book value of tangible fixed assets). We use the 
two-digit NACE sector-level price indexes for value added and investment as deflators. 
  We obtain firm-level wage data by type of employee from the Social Security Data Warehouse. 
For confidentiality reasons, our dataset reports annual averages per firm (instead of per individual 
worker) for annual remuneration and premia by type of workers,6 and number of employees per 
                                                       
5   This is motivated by the fact that 95% of the companies identified as multinationals in the Survey on 
Foreign Direct Investment file their annual accounts in Belgium using the full format. 
6   For cases that involve only one worker, we do not obtain the exact amount of wages and premia but the 
mean figure of the remuneration (or premium) class, defined in bands of EUR 500.  
6 
 
category. In this paper we focus on blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. Appendix A 
describes the trimming and adjustment method used to ensure consistency between the Social 
Security database and the annual accounts.7 
  Taking into account all these criteria, our base sample contains 115,706 observations for 
13,932 firms, of which 2,929 are MNFs (812 are Belgian MNFs and 2,117 are foreign MNFs). 
According to the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment, foreign-owned firms are, in most cases, 
owned by a single foreign company, via direct participation; the average number of foreign owners 
is 1.14. On average, foreign participation amounts to 90% of the firm's equity: 69% direct 
participation and 21% indirect participation. 
3  Net  Employment  flows 
  We first provide a global evaluation of the contribution of multinational firms to employment 
growth, through a net job creation analysis on the lines of Davis et al. (1996). We produce separate 
breakdowns for domestic firms (firms with no outward FDI and less than 50% in foreign ownership), 
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (firms at least 50% owned by a foreign company), and Belgian 
MNFs (firms which have outward FDI and in which no foreign company owns at least 50%). We 
also distinguish between entrants, incumbents and exiting firms. Entry and exit are defined as 
follows: (i) a firm is considered as an entrant in the year it officially started; (ii) a firm is considered 
as exiting in the year in which its total assets are recorded for the last time before 2006.8 Note that, 
as firms are identified on the basis of their value added tax (VAT) identification number, a firm exit 
may not necessarily indicate a close-down; it may equally indicate a take-over. Detailed figures of 
net job creation for entrants, incumbents and exiting firms, by type of firm, as well as separate 
figures for blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, are reported in Tables B.1 to B.3 in 
Appendix B. 
  The information presented in Table 1 highlights three main features of employment patterns. 
  First, net job creation is mainly due to domestic firms. In fact the relatively low figures for 
employment adjustments in MNFs mask contrasting patterns for Belgian and foreign MNFs. In our 
sample, foreign MNFs are, on several occasions, responsible for a substantial part of net 
employment growth, while Belgian MNFs make a negative contribution in almost every period. 
Between 1998 and 2005, Belgian MNFs destroyed 16,428 jobs, while the two other types of firms 
increased the number of jobs (+57,537 for domestic firms and +5,902 for foreign MNFs).  
  Second, incumbent firms often account for the largest share of net employment flows every 
year. This feature is confirmed for MNFs, where incumbents are the largest contributors to net job 
flows. This result is another reason for focusing on the employment adjustment behaviour of 
incumbent firms. These features translate to blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, as 
                                                       
7   To give an indication of the representativeness of our sample, firms in our sample account for one half of 
value added, as reported in National Accounts statistics for the same sectors of economic activity. Due to 
differences in firm size, our sample represents 83% of value added in manufacturing industries, and 30% 
in services, as reported in National Accounts statistics. 
8   In Belgium, nearly all companies have to file annual accounts. Nevertheless, a very small number of 
companies may be absent from the annual accounts database if they are late in filing their accounts. For 
this reason, we identify exiting firms by their absence from the sample for at least two consecutive years. 
Therefore, the exit dummy is defined over the 1996-2005 period on the basis of the annual accounts for 
2006 and 2007.  
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shown in Tables B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B. However, there are some exceptions to this general 
pattern. For Belgian MNFs, 9.2 thousand jobs were destroyed in 2000, but that was due mainly to 
the closure of the major national airline. In 2003, the exiting firm that represents the largest 
employment reduction among foreign MNFs was actually taken over by another foreign MNF, so 
that the total impact on employment was mitigated. 
 
Table 1 - Net employment flows 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total 
                Net creation
1  23.1  13.8  21.4  0.9  -13.6  -1.1  7.7  -5.2 
    Incumbent firms  27.7  21.8  37.2  9.0  -9.2  9.1  12.5  5.5 
    Firm exit  -8.2  -11.3  -19.0  -11.3  -8.5  -11.4  -6.2  -11.2 
Average net creation
2  2.1  1.2  1.9  0.1  -1.3  -0.1  0.7  -0.5 
Domestic firm                         
Net creation
1  16.7  15.4  19.7  3.1  0.4  -1.0  6.1  -2.8 
    Incumbent firms  20.0  22.3  25.0  8.5  4.2  5.6  8.6  5.5 
    Firm exit  -6.8  -10.2  -8.5  -8.6  -8.0  -7.3  -4.0  -8.6 
Average net creation
2  1.7  1.6  2.0  0.3  0.0  -0.1  0.7  -0.3 
MNFs 
Net creation
1  6.4  -1.6  1.7  -2.2  -14.0  -0.1  1.7  -2.4 
    Incumbent firms  7.8  -0.6  12.2  0.5  -13.5  3.5  3.8  0.0 
    Firm exit  -1.4  -1.1  -10.5  -2.7  -0.5  -4.1  -2.2  -2.6 
Average net creation
2  4.8  -1.2  1.2  -1.3  -7.7  -0.1  0.9  -1.5 
Belgian MNFs 
                Net creation
1  0.3  -2.3  -7.6  -2.9  -4.1  3.7  -2.4  -1.2 
    Incumbent firms  0.6  -2.1  2.2  -1.3  -4.0  3.7  -1.7  -0.7 
    Firm exit  -0.3  -0.2  -9.8  -1.6  -0.1  0.0  -0.7  -0.5 
Average net creation
2  0.9  -6.6  -22.3  -6.7  -9.5  8.9  -5.9  -3.5 
Foreign MNFs                         
Net creation
1  6.1  0.7  9.3  0.7  -9.9  -3.8  4.0  -1.2 
    Incumbent firms  7.1  1.6  10.0  1.8  -9.4  -0.2  5.5  0.7 
    Firm exit  -1.1  -0.9  -0.7  -1.1  -0.5  -4.0  -1.5  -2.1 
Average net creation
2  6.2  0.8  8.8  0.5  -7.1  -2.6  2.9  -0.9 
Note: The decomposition exercise is performed only up to 2005 as firm exits are defined only over the 1997-2005 period. 
Average net creation is defined as net employment creation over the number of firms. 
1 in thousands. 
2 in units. 
 
  Third, at the individual level, foreign MNFs appear to have the largest net employment growth. 
This is the motive underlying government efforts to attract and retain foreign multinationals.9 
However, the exit of a foreign MNF implies on average the destruction of 117.4 jobs, while the exit 
of a Belgian-owned firm only destroys 54.2 jobs. Even though only 13 of the 186 exiting firms are 
foreign MNFs, such a difference in job destruction between foreign MNFs and Belgian-owned firms 
fuels the fear of massive job losses due to the footloose nature of foreign multinationals, as they 
tend to set up large plants and may be less rooted in the national economy. 
To summarise the findings of this section, one important feature is that net employment flows 
are attributable largely to incumbent firms, especially in the case of foreign MNFs. This pattern 
                                                       
9  In our sample, domestic firms outnumber MNFs by more than four to one. This explains why domestic 
firms make the largest overall contribution to total employment growth.  
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holds for the employment of both white-collar and blue-collar workers. This implies that to 
understand labour adjustment flows, one should focus on firms conducting "business as usual" 
rather than on the creation or exit of firms. Analysis of the risk of MNF plant closure or relocation, 
although an important issue per se, may neglect the other key aspect of employment adjustment. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistical analysis shows that incumbent foreign MNFs undertake larger 
employment adjustments than incumbent domestic firms. This provides a first valuable indication of 
the validity of the hypothesis that adjustment costs are lower for foreign MNFs than for domestic 
firms. 
4  Estimation  of  labour  adjustment  costs 
Differences in labour demand adjustment between foreign multinationals and domestic firms 
may be explained by the fact that MNFs employ a larger proportion of white-collar workers (e.g. 
Navaretti  et al., 2003). According to the skill level of the workforce, there are differences in 
recruitment/training costs associated with hiring, differences in wage levels which induce 
differences in redundancy payments, as well as differences between blue-collar workers and white-
collar workers in regard to legislation on dismissal.10 To control for this composition effect, we 
distinguish between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers in our estimates of adjustment 
costs across firms (Bresson et al., 1992; Kramarz and Michaud, 2010). Another distinguishing 
feature of MNFs may be that, due to their ability to transfer production to alternative locations, 
MNFs may have more bargaining power than domestic firms with respect to government and/or 
unions, which may soften constraints imposed by labour market regulations. Additionally, they have 
an internal labour market where employment can be adjusted by shifting employees from one 
subsidiary to another. 
  We allow for differences in downsizing costs and upsizing costs by adopting an asymmetric 
functional form for net employment adjustment costs. This follows previous empirical estimates of 
adjustment costs. Our specification of adjustment costs is based on a cubic function,11 allowing for 
asymmetric costs of firing/downsizing and hiring/upsizing. Alternative adjustment cost functions 
have been proposed in the literature to account for asymmetry (for a survey, see Hamermesch and 
Pfann, 1996). 
  The specification used by Navaretti et al. (2003) is an approximation of quadratic and 
symmetric adjustment costs (Hamermesch, 1993). Using micro-data, the literature clearly shows 
that the adjustment costs have a more complex structure (Hamermesh, 1993; Hamermesh and 
Pfann, 1996). Even though the structure of adjustment costs may vary across specifications, two 
main features emerge from empirical analyses. First, adjustment costs are asymmetric, in the 
sense that termination costs differ from hiring costs. For example, in Europe, the former exceed the 
latter (Goux et al., 2001; Lundgren and Sjöstrom, 2001; Mathieu and Nicolas, 2006) while 
termination seems less costly than hiring in the case of the United States (Hamermesch, 1993). 
Second, adjustment costs may vary according to worker characteristics, especially the level of skill. 
                                                       
10   When the termination decision is taken by the firm, blue-collar workers are given notice ranging from 28 
days, if the worker has less than 20 years’ service, to 56 days otherwise. White-collar workers are given 
notice ranging from 3 to 18 months according to the employee’s length of service. 
11   This can be viewed as a Taylor approximation of a more general adjustment cost function.  
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Hiring and termination costs seem higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers (Bresson et 
al., 1992; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Kramarz and Michaud, 2010). Third, a part of the literature 
on adjustment costs has devoted substantial effort to testing for the presence of non convex 
adjustment costs, essentially modelled by a fixed adjustment cost. However, the results are not 
clear-cut.12 Note that one important motivation for non convex adjustment costs is to reproduce 
lumpy employment adjustment as observed in microeconomic data. Based on our dataset, 
episodes of no employment adjustment are seldom observed, at least compared to previous 
studies (only 9.2% of the observations in our dataset compared to 37% in Ejarque and 
Nilsen, 2008, and 57% in Lapatinas, 2009). Thus, we do not allow for the presence of lump-sum 
adjustment costs in our specification. 
4.1  Dynamic labour demand under asymmetric adjustment costs 
  We assume that firms operating within the same sector of activity share a common production 
function technology. The functional form of adjustment costs is identical for all companies and 
workers, but we allow for differences in adjustment costs between multinational and domestic firms, 
and between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. 
  To derive our Euler equations, we assume that prices are defined at the sector level, using: 
 
  ܲ௦௧ ൌܲ ሺ ܳ ௦௧ሻ  (1) 
 
where ܳ௦௧ stands for the production of sector s at time t. 
  We also assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i in period [t,t+1]. 
 







ఈ಼  (2) 
 
where ܣ௜௧ represents the productivity shock observed at the beginning of the [t,t+1] period, ܮప௧
஻ ෪ the 
stock of blue-collar workers, ܮప௧
ௐ ෪ the stock of white-collar workers, and ܭ௜௧ the capital stock, all 
during the [t,t+1[ period. 
  The capital stock at the beginning of the year depends on past capital minus depreciation at 
rate ߜ plus investment ܫ௜௧ିଵ: 
 
  ܭ௜௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߜሻܭ௜௧ିଵ ൅ܫ ௜௧ିଵ  (3) 
 
  The stock of white-collar workers available at the end of period [t,t+1[ is given by ܮ௜௧
஻ . Net 
employment flows result from hirings ܪ௜௧
஻, firings ܨ௜௧
஻, and natural quits ܳ௜௧
஻ that occur at the 






஻  (4a) 
                                                       
12   Abowd and Kramarz (2003) find evidence of high fixed costs, particularly termination costs, while Kramarz 
and Michaud (2010) report much lower fixed costs, once account is taken of the panel dimension of the 
data, and significant quadratic costs. Ejarque and Nilsen (2008) estimate substantial quadratic adjustment 








ௐ  (4b) 
 
  As hiring and firing decisions generate costs, we assume that net employment creation or 
destruction is costly for the firm. To be consistent with the assumption of imperfect substitution 
between inputs, our adjustment cost function introduces cross adjustment effects between the two 


















ௐ  (5) 
 
For negative ݀௝, downsizing costs exceed upsizing costs.14 For negative ݃, it is less costly to 
adjust blue-collar (white-collar) employment when one simultaneously adjusts the number of white-
collar (blue-collar) workers in the same direction. Under this assumption, however, substitution 
between the two labour inputs is costly in the sense that increasing the number of one type of 
workers while reducing the other type of workers increases total adjustment costs. Our 
specification encompasses the standard quadratic adjustment cost function, for ݀஻ ൌ݀ ௐൌ݃ൌ0 . 
  As we assume differences between domestic firms and MNFs in employment adjustment 
costs, we consider that 
 
  ܽ௝ ൌܽ ଴
௝൅ܽ ெேி
௝ ܦ௜௧
ெேி  (6a) 
 
  ݀௝ ൌ݀ ଴
௝൅݀ ெேி
௝ ܦ௜௧
ெேி  (6b) 
and 
  ݃ൌ݃ ଴൅݃ ெேிܦ௜௧
ெேி  (6c) 
 
  Considering the firm's decision on the number of blue-collar workers and the number of white-
collar workers, the value of the intertemporal objective function of the firm may be written, 
disregarding the capital adjustment costs, as 
 
  ܸ௜௧ ൌܧ ௧ቂ σ ߚ ௞ ஶ




ௐ െݎ ௜௧ܭ௜௧ െ ܣܥሺܮ௜௧
஻ ǡܮ ௜௧
ௐሻቁቃ  (7) 
 
with ߚ the discount rate and ݎ௜௧ the user cost of capital. 






















ೕ ቉ ൌ0   (8) 
                                                       
13  We also estimate an extended model with interactions inside the adjustment cost function between labour 
inputs and capital. As these crossed terms were estimated to be insignificant, we do not report them in 
the paper. 
14  Omitting this parameter may bias the estimate of ܽ௝ If downsizing costs exceed upsizing costs, an 
hypothesis supported by evidence of higher firing costs compared to hiring costs, ܽ௝ may be biased 




  The last term is due to the fact that hiring and firing decisions affect the stock of type j 
employment for both the current and next periods. The first two terms of equation (8) may be 
rewritten, using the Lerner condition, as a function of the mark-up, ߤ௜௧, simplifying the marginal 
product of type j labour thanks to the Cobb-Douglas specification, and under the Cournot 

















ೕ ቉ ൌ0   (9) 
 
From (5) and (9), the Euler equation for type j workers may be written as: 
 














௞ ሿ  (10) 
 
where kj. Note that the Euler equations depend on the production function coefficient of labour, 
which varies across worker skill types, as well as on the firm’s market power, and the discount 
factor, ߚ, in addition to adjustment costs. The production function coefficients and the firm’s market 
power are estimated from our sample of Belgian firms and foreign MNFs. As explained in the next 
section. ߚ, is fixed at 0.97; but we examine the robustness of our results with respect to alternative 
values. 
4.2  Estimation of production functions 
  In order to estimate production function coefficients, as well as adjustment cost coefficients, we 
restrict our sample to firms with sufficient observations, and trim for outliers. Trimming for outliers is 
performed along the following lines. We exclude the 99th percentile of gross employment flows of 
blue-collar workers and of white-collar workers, which may capture takeover events. We focus on 
observations where reported employment exits are consistent with the sum of reported exits due to 
lay-offs, those due to retirement, those due to early retirement, and those due to other reasons. In 
order to estimate production function coefficients, we retain only firm-year observations where firms 
employ both blue-collar and white-collar workers,15 and where the value of capital is above 
EUR 10016 and intermediate consumption is positive. We finally remove outliers by keeping 
observations where the log of apparent labour productivity, the log of the ratio of real average wage 
bill over apparent labour productivity, and the log of the capital-labour ratio lie within the range 
defined by the median minus or plus three times the inter-quartile range. This criterion is applied by 
year and NACE two-digit level sectors. Lastly, we focus on firms with at least two consecutive 
observations. 
  Taking into account all these criteria, our base sample contains 58,594 observations, 8,688 
firms, over the period 1997-2007, of which 504 are Belgian MNFs and 1,158 are foreign MNFs. 
                                                       
15   This criterion is needed to estimate the production function allowing for both blue-collar and white-collar 
labour inputs. 
16   This is intended to avoid downward bias in estimated production function coefficients.  
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Table A.1 in Appendix A reports some basic descriptive statistics, such as the mean and median of 
employment, wages, productivity and capital intensity, for domestic firms, Belgian MNFs and 
foreign MNFs. The figures confirm previous findings in the literature. Multinational companies, 
especially foreign ones, are larger; they employ a bigger share of white-collar workers, and are 
more capital intensive. Furthermore, MNFs, in particular foreign MNFs, offer higher wages, though 
this mainly holds for white-collar workers. Lastly, foreign multinationals have higher productivity 
while purely domestic firms lie at the opposite end of the scale. For all figures, Belgian MNFs lie 
between domestic and foreign MNFs, but are closer to foreign MNFs. 
  To estimate the labour production coefficients for non-clerical workers and clerical workers, we 
rely on the method recently proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006). The method extends the 
procedures initially proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) which 
correct for the simultaneity bias between factor demand and productivity shocks by assuming, for 
identification, that productivity shocks depend on capital (quasi-fixed factor) and on a proxy that 
must be strictly positive. The proxy is either investment, in the case of Olley and Pakes (1996), or 
intermediate inputs, in the case of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Following the latter, we consider 
intermediate inputs as proxy. 
  In line with the theoretical assumptions made in the model used to derive adjustment costs, we 
consider a Cobb-Douglas production function composed of two labour inputs - blue-collar workers 
and white-collar workers - in addition to capital at the beginning of the current period. The 
identification of production coefficients is based, in our application, on the following assumptions. 
The stock of capital accumulated until the end of period [t-1, t[ was built up by investment in period  
[t-1, t[ and is therefore orthogonal to the productivity shock that occurs at the beginning of period   
[t, t+1[. The identification of labour coefficients is based on the assumption that labour does not 
adjust immediately to productivity shocks; that is consistent with the presence of employment 
adjustment costs. This motivates our use of the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimator that allows for the 
presence of a correlation between productivity shock and current labour inputs. 
  As discussed in Griliches and Mairesse (1995), if we consider the case where firms have some 
degree of market power, and charge prices that differ from the sector-level prices, this has two 
important consequences for the estimation of production function parameters. First, the estimated 
parameters are the input coefficients divided by the firm’s mark-up; in our case, ߙ஻ ߤ Τ   and ߙ௪ ߤ Τ . 
Second, when output measures are deflated by sector-level price indices rather than by firm-level 
prices, due to the lack of the relevant data, this introduces aggregate demand shifts and industry 
price levels in the estimated production function (Foster et al., 2008; Katayama et al., 2003; Klette 
and Griliches, 1996). Therefore, our production function estimates include time dummies that vary 
across sectors, in order to overcome this issue. 
  We estimate input coefficients at the NACE one-digit sector level to capture the differences in 
technology across sectors and to preserve the accuracy of the estimates by keeping sample size 
within a reasonable range (see Table C.1 in Appendix C), Table 2 reports estimated production  
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function coefficients from the Ackerberg et al. (2006) method together with their bootstrap standard 
errors.17 
 





Food and textiles  0.178  0.424  0.388 
  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Wood, paper, chemicals, metal and non-metal 
products, machinery 
0.161  0.358  0.437 
(0.006)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Equipment and recycling  0.138  0.354  0.433 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Energy and construction  0.106  0.502  0.338 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Trade and hotels and restaurants  0.126  0.176  0.561 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Communication and financial intermediation  0.163  0.268  0.361 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Real estate and business activities  0.179  0.071  0.612 
   (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.034) 
Note: Estimates based on the 1997-2005 period; 58,594 observations and 8,688 firms. 
Point estimates of the production parameters are obtained from a genetic algorithm that makes it possible to minimise 
equation (25) in Ackerberg et al. (2006). At the first step, a 3
rd order polynomial is used to approximate the productivity 
shock function. The values reported in Table 2 are the mean values and the standard errors (in brackets) obtained by 
bootstrap of this estimation procedure (1000 replications). 
4.3  Estimation  of  adjustment  costs 
  We use the set of estimated production function parameters and assume a discount rate, ߚ, 
equal to 0.97 to construct the left-hand side variable of equation (10). We jointly estimate the 
adjustment cost parameters of blue-collar and white-collar workers. We use SGMM techniques 
(Arellano. and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998) in order to account for rational expectations 
that firms are assumed to form about their future level of employment. 
  Our baseline results are given in Table 3. Column (1) reports the estimates of adjustment costs 
for the entire sample; column (2) tests differences between MNFs and domestic firms. The point 
estimates reported in Table 3 are used to compute the average and marginal adjustment costs for 
various cases of employment adjustment, displayed in Table 4. Results for the entire sample 
highlight four main features of employment adjustment costs. 
  First, adjustment costs are convex, as the estimates of ܽ஻ and ܽௐ in Table 3 are significant and 
larger than the estimates of ݀஻ and ݀ௐ. For instance, the marginal adjustment cost of blue-collar 
workers rises from EUR 227 to EUR 449 when οܮ௜௧
஻  increases from one to two.18 
                                                       
17   For comparison, Tables B.2.a and B.2.b in Appendix B report production function coefficients estimated 
using the Ackerberg et al. methodology, making some alternative assumptions on labour flexibility (i.e. 
when blue-collar employment is flexible, or when both blue-collar and white-collar employment are fully 
flexible) or the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methodologies. 
18   At first sight, our estimates of the average or marginal costs of adjustment may look low. The reason is 
that we analyse net employment flows, which also include voluntary departures, retirement and the expiry 
of temporary contracts. In our sample, workers who have been laid off account for 25% of worker 
outflows, on average.  
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Table 3: Estimates of adjustment costs for blue-collar and white-collar workers 
  (1)  (2) 
ܽ஻  228.75***  291.84*** 
  (34.05)  (61.43) 
ܽ୑୒୊
஻     -93.67 
    (96.47) 
݀஻  -2.22**  -7.99** 
  (1.12)  (3.21) 
݀୑୒୊
஻     7.98** 
    (3.20) 
ܽௐ  835.20***  1,191.58*** 
  (--99.13)  (217.80) 
ܽ୑୒୊
ௐ     -692.26*** 
    (259.00) 
݀ௐ  -8.36***  -20.98** 
  (2.60)  (8.59) 
݀୑୒୊
ௐ     14.40 
    (9.34) 
 ݃   -216.40***  -283.13*** 
  (54.79)  (74.89) 
݃୑୒୊    185.13 
    (115.90) 
Wald, H0:ܽ஻ ൌ ܽௐ  34.38  15.96 
Wald, H0:݀஻ ൌ ݀ௐ  4.82*  2.03*** 
Wald, H0: ܽ஻ ൅ ܽ୑୒୊
஻ ൌ 0    11.20 
Wald, H0: ܽௐ ൅ ܽ୑୒୊
ௐ ൌ 0    18.07 
Wald, H0: ݀஻ ൅ ݀୑୒୊
஻ ൌ 0    0.00*** 
Wald, H0: ݀ௐ ൅ ݀୑୒୊
ௐ ൌ 0    7.76 
Wald, H0:݃ ൅ ݃୑୒୊ ൌ 0    1.50*** 
Sargan  19.15*  30.41 
Notes: 37,553 observations and 5,544 firms over 1998-2006, standard errors in brackets. All equations include year and 
sector dummies. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
Instruments for the level equation: stacked values of οሾοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧
௫ ],  οሾοܮ௜௧ିଶ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ







௭ ] and οሾοܮ௜௧ିଶ
௭ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௭ ሿ, where x=B and z=W for the blue-collar equation, x=W and 
z=B for the white-collar equation, and interactions with MNF, a dummy equal to one for MNF, in column (2). 











௭ ] and ሾοܮ௜௧ିଶ
௭ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௭ ሿ, where x=B and z=W for the blue-collar equation, x=W and 
z=B for the white-collar equation, and interactions with MNF, a dummy equal to one for MNF, in column (2). 
 
  Second, adjustment costs are asymmetric in the sense that firing costs are greater than hiring 
costs, as suggested by the negative and significant estimated value of ݀஻ and ݀ௐ. For example, 
reducing the number of white-collar workers by five costs an average of EUR 140 more than 
increasing the white-collar workforce by five. 
  Third,  the  estimated  ݃ is significantly negative, which indicates that adjusting one type of 
labour is less costly when the other type is adjusted in the same direction. By contrast, substituting 
one type of worker for the other increases the cost of adjustment. To illustrate these points, 
consider the base case of increasing white-collar employment by five; this induces an average  
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adjustment cost of EUR 2,018. If the number of clerical workers is now raised by four and the 
number of non-clerical workers by one, the average adjustment cost falls to EUR 1,150. By 
contrast, reducing the number of blue-collar workers by one and increasing the number of white-
collar workers by six, raises the average adjustment cost to EUR 3,169. 
 












1  0  114  227    
-1  0  115  -231 
2  0  226  449 
-2  0  232  -466 
5  0  553  1,088 
-5  0  590  -1,199    
0  1  415     827 
0  -1  420  -844 
0  2  824  1,637 
0  -2  846  -1,704 
0  5  2,018  3,967 
0  -5  2,158     -4,385 
5  0  553  1,088  -1,082 
4  1  266  663  -39 
6  -1  1,135  1,509  -2,142 
0  5  2,018  -1,082  3,967 
1  4  1,150  -639  2,991 
-1  6  3,169  -1,529  4,927 
 
  Fourth, results reported in Table 4 show that average and marginal adjustment costs are more 
than three times higher for white-collar workers than for blue collar-workers. This may be explained 
by the fact that blue-collar workers develop less firm-specific human capital and are therefore more 
easily replaced. It is also due to less stringent legislation on dismissal, as explained above. The 
result is consistent with the estimates of Alonso-Borrego (1998), for Spain, based on an Euler 
equation model with a comparable adjustment cost function. It is also in line with Abowd and 
Kramarz  (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2010), who find that termination costs are much 
greater for higher-skilled workers than for lower-skilled workers in France. 
  In all, we find evidence of convex, asymmetric and cross adjustment costs. For a given amount 
of employment change, total adjustment costs are higher for white-collar workers than for blue-
collar workers. 
  Next, we examine differences across domestic firms and multinationals. The major difference is 
that the adjustment costs are lower for the latter than for the former. The gap is much larger in the 
case of white-collar workers. Marginal and average adjustment costs of MNFs are only half those 
of domestic firms for white-collar workers. The difference is around 25% for blue-collar workers. 
  Differences between the two types of firms also concern adjustment cost asymmetry. As 
illustrated by Figures 1.a-1.b, adjustment costs for non-clerical workers are strongly asymmetric for 
domestic firms, which face larger downsizing costs than upsizing costs. This is consistent with the 
estimated value of ݀஻ in column (2) of Tables 3. Such asymmetry is absent in multinationals, as 
evidenced by the Wald tests for the hypothesis that ݀஻ ൅ ݀MNF
ܤ ൌ0 . For white-collar workers, the  
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results are less clear-cut. Indeed, the difference in asymmetry coefficients between domestic firms 
and MNFs is positive but not significant.19 
 
Figure 1 - Total adjustment costs (in EUR thousands) 






4.4  What may justify differences in adjustment costs? 
  Several explanations may be put forward to justify the differences in adjustment costs between 
domestic and multinational companies. First, it has been argued that domestic firms may be more 
deeply rooted in the local economy, and may try harder to avoid job losses. Other explanations are 
                                                       
19  To test the robustness of our results, we repeat these estimations using alternative estimates of 
production function coefficients, using the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure with alternative assumptions 
on labour flexibility, and the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology or the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
procedures, controlling for firm survival. We also perform robustness tests considering a discount rate of 
0.95 and 0.99, instead of the 0.97 rate considered above. Our results are robust to those alternative 
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related to the larger scale of MNFs compared to domestic firms. Labour indivisibilities make labour 
adjustment more costly, as it may be more damaging for the organisation of production to reduce 
employment by one unit in a "10 employees" firm than in a "100 employees" company. They may 
also have a more developed Human Resources Department. Lastly, they may have stronger 
bargaining power with respect to unions, e.g. because of their footloose nature and because their 
employment decisions affect a large number of workers. 
  We start our analysis with the origin of firms. The argument that national firms may be more 
reluctant to undertake massive job losses (reluctance effect) holds for Belgian domestic firms and 
potentially for Belgian multinationals. The latter may be less inclined to close production plants at 
home than abroad, in the case of negative shocks. To take into account the presence of a potential 
reluctance effect, we have introduced a dummy variable for Belgian MNFs that interacts with the 
parameters of the adjustment cost function.  As shown in column (2) of Table 4, none of the 
coefficients which interacted with the dummy for Belgian MNFs is significant, and the estimates of 
other coefficients are of the same order of magnitude as in column (1).20 Consequently, there is no 
reluctance effect that would create differences in labour adjustment between Belgian MNFs and 
foreign MNFs. 
In column (3), we examine the consequence of the union effect on the difference in adjustment 
costs between domestic firms and MNFs. On the one hand, the presence of unions in a firm may 
increase adjustment costs. On the other hand, the union effect may be dampened in MNFs, as 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis unions may be greater than that of domestic firms. To capture the 
union effect, we introduce a dummy variable associated with a threshold value (more than 50 
employees) beyond which union representation is compulsory. Again, this dummy variable 
interacts with the adjustment cost parameters. However, this proxy may also capture a labour 
indivisibility effect. Unions and indivisibility must have opposite effects on adjustment costs. If the 
union effect dominates, it should increase adjustment costs. Furthermore, if MNFs have more 
bargaining power with respect to unions than domestic firms, adjustment costs of MNFs would 
remain lower even after controlling for the union effect, i.e. ܽ୑୒୊
௝  would remain significantly 
negative. Our estimates suggest that the firms above the threshold have lower adjustment costs. 
This is true for blue-collar and white-collar employees, as ܽ୮୰୭୶୷
஻  and ܽ୮୰୭୶୷
ௐ   are both negative. 
Consequently, the indivisibility effect, that reduces the adjustment costs for large firms, dominates 
over the union effect. Furthermore, the ܽ୑୒୊
௝  parameters of the adjustment cost function are now 
smaller and non significant. This suggests that MNFs do not seem to have any particular ability in 
the management of their relationships with unions.21   
                                                       
20  To test the assumption that European MNFs could adopt behaviour similar to that of domestic Belgian 
firms, we decompose foreign MNFs into those that belong to the EU and those that do not. The estimates 
show that there is no significant difference between MNFs according to their nationality. 
21   Note that this result may also be viewed as a preliminary indication that firm size potentially explains the 
difference between MNFs and domestic firms. We explore this issue in more detail below.  
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Table 5: Estimates of adjustment costs as a function of firm characteristics 










ܽ஻  291.84***  295.12***  563.97***  299.18***  295.37***  624.03*** 
  (61.43)  (64.27)  (80.14)  (62.08)  (58.28)  (130.10) 
ܽ୑୒୊
஻   -93.67  -96.21  -30.81  -57.10  -12.17  48.54 
  (96.47)  (96.36)  (104.60)  (94.23)  (82.39)  (85.40) 
ܽ୮୰୭୶୷
஻     -24.72  -337.67***  -620.59**  -166.34*  -456.12*** 
    (140.50)  (100.50)  (259.70)  (90.99)  (138.20) 
݀஻  -7.99**  -8.28**  -10.18***  -7.36**  -6.34**  -21.78*** 
  (3.21)  (3.44)  (2.38)  (3.05)  (2.62)  (6.75) 
݀୑୒୊
஻   7.98**  7.85**  8.76***  6.94**  4.91  4.53* 
  (3.20)  (3.68)  (3.32)  (3.12)  (3.39)  (2.55) 
݀୮୰୭୶୷
஻     0.36  1.60  3.73  2.37  17.13*** 
    (1.18)  (3.25)  (6.57)  (2.93)  (6.72) 
ܽௐ  1,191.58***  1205.64***  1,881.63***  1,223.91***  1,377.40***  1,269.59*** 
  (217.80)  (231.40)  (230.40)  (176.30)  (212.40)  (171.80) 
ܽ୑୒୊
ௐ   -692.26***  -704.23***  -388.59  -807.46***  -691.98***  -564.39** 
  (259.00)  (261.00)  (265.30)  (206.60)  (227.90)  (271.00) 
ܽ୮୰୭୶୷
ௐ     285.21  -994.36***  1,448.41  -518.61**  -179.24 
    (346.20)  (313.00)  (1474.10)  (266.50)  (253.40) 
݀ௐ  -20.98**  -19.77***  -52.53***  -26.31***  -22.43***  -19.81** 
  (8.59)  (8.78)  (9.68)  (9.84)  (8.72)  (7.95) 
݀୑୒୊
ௐ   14.40  12.07  5.67  16.85*  14.95*  7.76 
  (9.34)  (9.46)  (7.90)  (9.84)  (8.48)  (10.48) 
݀୮୰୭୶୷
ௐ     -8.30  40.26***  77.71*  5.79  5.23 
    (11.81)  (11.27)  (43.76)  (8.31)  (8.34) 
 ݃   -283.13***  -288.55***  -305.55*  -249.18***  -236.01***  -255.08* 
  (74.89)  (75.41)  (174.70)  (76.53)  (90.36)  (141.90) 
݃୑୒୊  185.13  159.24  194.87*  161.03  223.70**  257.46** 
  (115.90)  (118.60)  (110.80)  (112.30)  (115.80)  (115.80) 
݃୮୰୭୶୷    166.12  23.00  -674.55  -276.51  -55.03 
    (194.00)  (183.20)  (649.10)  (191.50)  (154.10) 
Sargan  30.41  34.77  39.43  38.34  38.12  42.26 
Notes: 37,553 observations and 5,544 firms over 1998-2006, standard errors in brackets. All equations include year and 
sector dummies. Belgian MNF is a dummy equal to one for Belgian MNFs, threshold is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with 50 
employees or more at the beginning of the period; %ftc the firm percentage of workers under fixed-term contracts in the total 
workforce at the beginning of the period; turnftc is the firm average turnover rate of fixed-term contract workers at the 
beginning of the period, computed as ሺ݅݊௙௧௖ ൅ ݋ݑݐ௙௧௖ሻሺ ݅݊ ൅ ݋ݑݐሻ Τ  where in refers to the number of worker inflows, out is the 
number of worker outflows and ftc denotes workers under fixed-term contracts; early ret  is a dummy equal to one if there is 
early retirement in the firm at least once over the period. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
Instruments for the level equation: stacked values of οሾοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧
௫ ],  οሾοܮ௜௧ିଶ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ
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The type of employment contract may be relevant to explain the differences in adjustment 
costs between domestic firms and MNFs. Several papers have highlighted the role of fixed-term 
contracts to permit flexible labour management and reduce labour adjustment cost (Dhyne and 
Mahy, 2009, Goux et al., 2001, among others). Early retirement procedures have been pointed out 
by companies as a cost-reducing strategy in a couple of countries including Belgium (Babecky et  
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al., 2009). From these previous results, we investigate whether MNFs are better able to use the 
legal procedures that improve flexibility in employment management. We consider two measures of 
fixed-term contracts. The first is the firm average fraction of the workforce hired under fixed-term 
contracts over the period. The second is the firm average turnover of fixed-term contract workers 
over the period.22 To control for early retirement, we consider a dummy equal to one if the firm 
resorts to early retirement at least once over the period. 
Introducing both proxies for fixed-term contracts in our model, ܽ୮୰୭୶୷
஻    is significantly negative, 
confirming that using this type of contracts decreases adjustment costs. But, the parameter ܽ୑୒୊
஻    is 
still  not significantly different from zero (see columns (4) and (5)). By contrast, MNFs still 
experience lower ܽௐ than domestic firms after controlling for the use of fixed-term contracts. Using 
estimates in column (5) to compute the average adjustment costs shows that reducing the number 
of white-collar workers by two generates an average cost of EUR 2,815 for a domestic firm and 
EUR 1,391 for a multinational. Note that in the baseline case, without controlling for fixed-term 
contracts, these costs were of EUR 2,439 and EUR 904, respectively. The introduction of the 
dummy variable relating to early retirement provides similar qualitative results (see column (6)). 
Again, MNFs continue to have lower adjustment costs for white-collar workers than domestic firms. 
For a reduction of white-collar workers by two, a multinational bears an average adjustment cost of 
EUR 1,153 while for a domestic firm the cost is EUR 2,592. Even though the difference between 
average adjustment costs is reduced by the introduction of proxies for fixed-term contracts and 
early retirement, it remains sizeable. Our results suggest that MNFs maintain an employment 
adjustment cost advantage over domestic firms in the case of white-collar workers. Consequently, 
we cannot reject the assumption that MNFs are better at managing the legal procedures in favour 
of a greater flexibility of employment. 
4.5  MNFs' labour adjustment costs and size effect 
  The results presented above suggest that part of the differences in labour adjustment costs 
between MNFs and domestic firms is due to several factors (union representation, use of flexible 
labour contracts, early retirement). Firm size is often suspected as the reason for heterogeneity in 
labour adjustment costs. The fact that MNFs seem to face lower adjustment costs compared to 
domestic firms may simply reflect the fact that MNFs are typically larger than domestic firms.23 
Their larger scale may make it easier to adjust employment, as it may allow them to circumvent 
labour indivisibility issues, for instance. As mentioned above, they may have a more developed 
Human Resources Department, improving their ability to manage employment changes. 
  Therefore, it is important to control for size to properly evaluate whether MNFs have an 
advantage in labour adjustment over domestic firms. This was done to some extent in the previous 
section, as the various explanatory factors considered above are largely related to firm size. Union 
representation is typically associated with size, and the use of flexible contracts or early retirement 
is more common in larger firms. To take proper account of the fact that firm size may partly affect 
                                                       
22  It is defined as ൫݅݊௙௧௖ ൅ ݋ݑݐ௙௧௖൯ ሺ݅݊ ൅ ݋ݑݐሻ Τ  where in refers to the number of worker inflows, out is the 
number of worker outflows and ftc denotes workers under fixed-term contracts. 
23   The average workforce of MNFs amounts to 212 employees, while the figure for domestic firms is only 67, 
as shown in Table A.1. in Appendix A.  
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our results, we introduce a flexible specification of the adjustment cost function that directly 
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where kj 
 
  This specification encompasses our baseline specification and a specification on the lines of 
Meghir et al. (1996) as special cases where the ș parameter respectively equals 0 and -1. Values 
of ș between 0 and -1 induce a smaller size effect than the value stipulated in the specification 
according to Meghir et al. (1996), while a parameter below -1 implies a stronger size effect. 
Considering several values for the ș parameter, we estimate our baseline model to see how size 
affects the differences in the adjustment cost parameters between MNFs and domestic firms. The 
results are summarised in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 - The impact of size on the MNF coefficients 
   T = 0
(1)  T = -0.5  T = -0.6  T= -0.8  T = -1
(2)  T = -1.2 
ܽ୑୒୊
஻   -93.67  457.60  3,494.44  18,598**  62,345***  201,126*** 
(96.47)  (1,648.2)  (3,141.3)  (9,073)  (24,737)  (72,014) 
݀୑୒୊
஻   7.98**  280.81  -265.30  -6,537*  -50,170*  -347,951*** 
(3.20)  (250.6)  (590.3)  (3,475)  (27,065)  (137,916) 
ܽ୑୒୊
ௐ   -692.26***  -3,809.59*  -3,545.10  6,327  40,434  137,725** 
(259.00)  (2,175.4)  (3,547.0)  (10,050)  (29,578)  (70,547) 
݀୑୒୊
ௐ   14.40  -33.14  -1,622.74  -32,028**  -235,198*  -1,365,632** 
(9.34)  (728.7)  (2,034.4)  (16,356)  (144,116)  (672,282) 
݃୑୒୊  185.13  621.80  996.59  2,715  5,994  1,552 
(115.90)  (1,665.7)  (2,821.4)  (7,993)  (20,793)  (48,403) 
Sargan  30.41  36.48  35.41  35.24  35.87  34.26 
Notes:  37,553 observations and 5,544 firms over 1998-2006, standard errors in brackets. All equations include year and 
sector dummies. MNF is a dummy equal to one for MNF. 
(1) no size effect, 
(2) specification according to Meghir et al. (1996) 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
Instruments for the level equation: stacked values of οሾοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧
௫ ],  οሾοܮ௜௧ିଶ
௫ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ
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௭ ሿ, where x=B and z=W for the blue-collar equation, x=W and 
z=B for the white-collar equation, and interactions with firm type dummies. 
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௭ െ ߚοܮ௜௧ିଵ
௭ ሿ, where x=B and z=W for the blue-collar equation, x=W and 
z=B for the white-collar equation, and interactions with firm type dummies. 
 
  Introducing size effects in the specification has a varying impact on the adjustment cost 
differentials between MNFs and domestic firms. For instance, if ș equals -0.6, which represents a 
less than proportional size effect, we find no significant differences in labour adjustment costs  
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between MNFs and domestic firms. However, considering a specification according to Meghir et 
al. (1996) (ș = -1.) or a specification with stronger size effects (ș = -1.2), we observe that, in 
contrast to the results with no firm effect, MNFs might suffer from adjustment cost disadvantages 
for both blue-collar and white-collar employment (the ܽ୑୒୊
஻   and ܽ୑୒୊
ௐ   become significantly positive) 
and their adjustment cost structure might become more asymmetric, implying larger downsizing 
costs relative to upsizing costs (the ݀୑୒୊
஻  and ݀୑୒୊
ௐ  become significantly negative). 
  Controlling for size leads to opposing conclusions about the difference in adjustment costs 
between MNFs and domestic firms. We therefore consider it hazardous to draw definite 
conclusions about the impact of firm size on the potential advantages or disadvantages in labour 
adjustment costs of MNFs compared to domestic firms. 
5  Conclusion 
  Our empirical estimates of adjustment cost parameters point to a significant difference between 
multinationals and domestic firms. MNFs face lower adjustment costs for clerical employees than 
domestic firms. The difference in adjustment costs is much smaller for non-clerical employment. 
Together, these results indicate that, for a given negative shock, MNFs may more easily downsize 
employment than domestic firms, and more especially that white-collar employment volatility is 
greater in MNFs than in domestic firms. 
  To explain this difference, three main arguments can be raised.  First, foreign MNFs may be 
less deeply rooted in the national economy than Belgian MNFs. We show that this explanation is 
not validated empirically; Belgian MNFs share the same adjustment cost parameters as foreign 
MNFs. Second, MNFs may be better able to use the legal procedures in favour of greater flexibility 
on the local labour market. We find that taking account of the importance of fixed-term contracts or 
early retirement slightly reduces the difference in adjustment costs between MNFs and domestic 
firms, but the difference remains very large. 
  Third, MNFs could have more bargaining power vis-à-vis unions. When controlling for the 50-
employees threshold, above which union representation is compulsory, the difference in 
adjustment costs between MNFs and domestic firms disappears. However, this threshold may also 
capture labour indivisibility effects, i.e. employment adjustment is easier the larger the firm. 
  Behind these three arguments lies the more general issue of the firm’s size. Görg and 
Strobl (2003) find that MNFs are as footloose as domestic firms when one controls for size. The 
estimate of a flexible specification of the adjustment cost function controlling for size clearly shows 
that the impact of size is very sensitive to the weight of firm size.  The role of firm size and what 
specification is the most appropriate to take size into account are clear avenues for further 
research. 
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Appendix A - construction of the dataset 
  In order to obtain a sample of multinationals and domestic firms, we focus on firms that report 
full annual accounts24 over the period 1997-2007. More precisely, we restrict our attention to firms 
that have filed at least one complete set of annual accounts, have employed at least 10 employees 
over the period considered, have positive value added and nominal fixed assets over EUR 100. 
  This choice is motivated by the aim to obtain a sample of domestic firms with characteristics 
comparable to multinationals. Over the period 1997-2005, 95% of the companies identified as 
multinationals from the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment file full annual accounts. Therefore, in 
order to compare multinationals with a sample of comparable domestic firms, we consider the set 
of firms that file complete annual accounts. Since the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment is not 
exhaustive, we are aware that multinational firms which have not participated in the FDI survey 
may be seen as domestic firms,. We presume that this concerns a minority of cases. 
  We focus on manufacturing industries, construction and trade, market services and financial 
intermediation (i.e. two-digit 2003 NACE codes between 15 and 74). (i.e. two-digit NACE rev1.1 
codes between 15 and 73). We exclude the sector "other business activities" (NACE code 74), 
which includes temporary employment agencies, because this could seriously bias our job flow 
estimates. We also restrict our sample to "profit maximising" firms, defined according to their legal 
form, e.g. we exclude non profit associations and public utilities. 
  We used annual and social reports, to construct data on the main balance sheet items such as 
total assets, value added, the capital stock (measured as the book value of tangible fixed assets) 
as well as gross employment flows by type of workers and by reason for leaving,  
Adjustment of NACE codes and annual accounts 
  We use the 60 branches sector-level price indexes for value added and investment as 
deflators. We take the two-digit NACE rev1.1 codes provided in the annual accounts dataset. 
These are defined according to the main activity of the firm. Some firms may change their main 
activity during the period considered. We corrected temporary NACE codes to avoid discontinuity, 
and possible exclusion of firms for some estimation procedures. We use the following rule: firms 
that have two, three or four different NACE codes over the period 1996-2007 take a single NACE 
code over the entire period if the most frequently observed code is reported for at least 8 periods 
and the least observed ones for at most 2 periods. In this case, firms are given the most frequently 
observed NACE code for the entire period.25 
  In the majority of cases, firms in our sample file annual accounts that cover a period of 12 
months from January to December. However, in some cases, their annual accounts overlap two (or 
                                                       
24  According to Belgian accounting legislation, a company falls within this category, in 2007, either when the 
yearly average of its workforce is at least 100 or when at least two of the following thresholds are 
exceeded: (1) yearly average of workforce is 50, (2) turnover (excluding VAT) amounts to at least 
EUR 7,300,000, (3) total assets exceed EUR 3,650,000. In general, the latter two thresholds are altered 
every four years in order to take account of inflation. 
  Less than 10% of the companies in Belgium report full annual accounts, but these represent most of the 
value added and employment. 
25  To have an idea of the importance of these corrections, in our sample of 31,341 firms, 20% firms have at 
least two different NACE codes before adjustment (5,703 have two NACE code, 482 have three, and 17 
have four different NACE codes). After NACE code adjustment, 95% of firms have only one code, 1,364 
firms have two NACE codes and 90 firms have three NACE codes.  
25 
 
more) calendar years. In order to obtain comparable series across firms and over time, use the 
appropriate yearly deflators, and ensure consistency when merging annual accounts data with 
other firm information such as FDI or foreign trade information, we annualise the annual accounts. 
Flows are adjusted by taking a weighted average of t and t-1 flows. Stocks are adjusted by adding 
to the current year’s stocks the weighted change in stocks between the current year and the next 
year. The procedure attributes a missing value when there is not enough information to cover the 
entire year, for example when information about the first or last months of a given year is missing. 
This does not apply for the last year in which the firm is observed and for flows in the first year in 
which the firm is covered.26 
  Before annualising flow and stock variables in annual accounts, we perform a small set of 
corrections on the dataset. These involve some corrections to the date and year of the annual 
accounts,27 in cases where the number of months covered by the annual account appears 
incorrect.28 
  Lastly, we extrapolate missing values by taking the average difference between the previous 
year and the next year. We allow up to two consecutive missing values. 
  We also extrapolate missing participation rates of inward and outward FDI. Missing 
observations may be due to a temporary drop below the reporting threshold, or to non-reporting. 
Given the highly stable participation rates, extrapolation is really a correction of the dataset and 
does not involve any significant assumptions. 
Social Security Wage data 
  We obtain firm-level wage data by type of employee from the Social Security Data Warehouse. 
For confidentiality reasons, we ask for firm-year averages of annual remuneration and premia by 
type of workers, and number of employees per category. For cases that involve only one worker, 
we will not obtain the exact amount of wages and premia but the mean of the remuneration (or 
premium) class, defined in bands of EUR 500. These data are used to obtain our measures of 
wages (wages of blue-collar workers, wages of white-collar workers), as well as the number of 
employees by category of worker. 
  Consistency between the Social Security database and the annual accounts is not perfect 
because the former refers to the gross labour compensation received by the employee, while the 
latter is related to the employers' labour costs. Since our estimates refer to labour costs, we correct 
the wage measures obtained from social security by a proportionality factor. 
  We compute the ratio of total labour costs (account 62) and wage bill (account 620) using the 
data in the annual accounts and we use this ratio to convert the average wage received by the 
employee to the average wage paid by the firm. As we do not have a measure of total labour costs 
                                                       
26  To have an idea of the importance of this phenomenon, note that in our sample of 31,430 firms over the 
1996-2007 period, 16,694 always closed their annual accounts in December (31/12/xx), 2,554 always 
closed their annual accounts every 12 months but not in December, the remaining 12,182 firms followed 
an irregular pattern (for instance some or their accounts cover an accounting period other than 12 months). 
Therefore, the annual accounts of 47% of the firms in our sample have to be adjusted. 
27  For example, when the end date was 2 January 2005, we change it to 31 December 2004. By doing this 
we attribute the values reported in the annual accounts to the year 2004 instead of 2005. 
28   A limited number (48 observations) of errors in the number of months were identified based on 
inconsistency between flow variables and the number of months reported, or auditor reports. They may be 
due to encoding errors.  
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and direct labour costs by type of workers, the correction factor is the same for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. 
Trimming for outliers 
  Our base sample, used in Section 3 of the paper, is constructed as follows. First, we avoid 
major inconsistency between annual accounts and Social Security data by considering only firm-
year observations where the ratio of the total wage bill reported in the annual accounts and that 
constructed from Social Security data lies between 0.532 and 1.114.29 Second, in order to correct 
Social Security wages by the discrepancy between the wage bill and labour costs, we concentrate 
on firm-year observations where the ratio of total labour cost to the wage bill, as given in the annual 
accounts, is greater than one but smaller than 2. 
  Our trimmed sample, used in Section 4, further restricts the base sample in order to estimate 
production function coefficients as well as adjustment cost coefficients. Trimming for outliers is 
performed along the following lines. We exclude the 99th percentile of gross employment flows of 
blue-collar workers and of white-collar workers, which may capture takeover events. We drop the 
sector "other business activities", which includes temporary employment agencies, because this 
could seriously bias job flow estimates. We focus on observations where reported employment 
exits are consistent with the sum of reported exits due to lay-offs, those due to retirement, those 
due to early retirement, and those due to other reasons. 
  In order to estimate production function coefficients, we retain only firm-year observations 
where firms employ both blue-collar and white-collar workers, where the value of capital is above 
EUR 100 and intermediate consumption is positive. We finally eliminate outliers by keeping 
observations where the log of apparent labour productivity, the log of the ratio of real average wage 
bill over apparent labour productivity and the log of the capital-labour ratio, lie within the range 
defined by the median minus or plus three times the inter-quartile range. This criterion is applied by 
year and NACE 2 digit sectors. Lastly, we focus on firms with at least two consecutive 
observations. 
  Table A.1 reports the mean and median of employment, wages, productivity and capital 
intensity, for domestic firms, and MNFs comprising both Belgian and foreign MNFs. The last four 
columns of Table A.1 report the estimated difference and t-statistic with respect to purely domestic 
firms, controlling for size, ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ measured by employment, sector and year. Specifically, we 
perform the following regressions30 
 
  ݔ௜௧ ൌܽ൅ܾ ஻ܦ ௜௧
ெேி ൅ܾ ௅ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ߜ ௦൅ߜ ௧൅ߝ ௜௧  (a.1) 
and 
  ݔ௜௧ ൌܽ൅ܾ ஻ܦ ௜௧
஻௘௟௚௜௔௡ெேி ൅ܾ ிܦ ௜௧
௙௢௥௘௜௚௡ெேி ൅ܾ ௅ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ߜ ௦൅ߜ ௧൅ߝ ௜௧  (a.2) 
                                                       
29   These thresholds represent the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile of the distribution of the ratio of the wage bill 
reported in the annual accounts and that constructed from the Social Security data. 
30  ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ is omitted when ݔ௜௧ stands for employment.  
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Table A.1 - Descriptive statistics 
Unconditional  Conditional difference 
Mean  Median  wrt domestic 
         coef.  t-stat 
number of employees   
Domestic  66.91  46.00 
MNF  212.27  141.00  139.96  108.39 
Belgian MNF  201.70  123.00  126.43  53.62 
Foreign MNF  216.00  147.00  144.76  98.56 
percentage of white-collar workers   
Domestic  0.39  0.32 
MNF  0.48  0.42  0.13  43.40 
Belgian MNF  0.44  0.37  0.11  21.18 
Foreign MNF  0.49  0.44  0.14  41.08 
average wage   
Domestic  38,014  37,221 
MNF  47,031  45,029  7,901  69.96 
Belgian MNF  42,486  41,273  3,930  20.49 
Foreign MNF  48,635  46,721  9,355  74.28 
blue-collar wage   
Domestic  31,376  31,031 
MNF  35,647  34,569  2,305  26.29 
Belgian MNF  33,064  32,432  22  0.15 
Foreign MNF  36,559  35,322  3,141  32.05 
white-collar wage    
Domestic  48,616  47,477 
MNF  59,023  57,434  7,862  50.15 
Belgian MNF  54,340  52,843  3,359  12.59 
Foreign MNF  60,676  59,123  9,512  54.31 
apparent labour productivity   
Domestic  58,909  51,336 
MNF  84,071  69,200  26,707  54.56 
Belgian MNF  73,202  62,981  16,853  20.20 
Foreign MNF  87,907  72,478  30,318  55.34 
TFP    
Domestic  42,836  38,259 
MNF  51,891  41,388  13,069  39.74 
Belgian MNF  45,468  35,651  8,404  14.98 
Foreign MNF  54,158  43,510  14,780  40.11 
percentage of fixed-term contracts   
Domestic  0.032  0 
MNF  0.038  0.016  0.00  -1.95 
Belgian MNF  0.032  0.010  -0.01  -4.20 
Foreign MNF  0.041  0.019  0.00  -0.04 
percentage of outflows due to early retirement 
Domestic  0.028  0 
MNF  0.059  0  0.02  11.70 
Belgian MNF  0.051  0  0.01  3.76 
Foreign MNF  0.062  0  0.02  12.17 
Note: final sample trimmed for outliers as explained in Appendix, 58,594 observations and 8,688 firms over 1997-2007; 
'conditional difference' reports the conditional difference and t-stat, controlling for firm employment, sector and year. The 





Table B.1 - Net employment flows 
a. Total employment flows (in thousands)  
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total  23.1  13.8  21.4  0.9  -13.6  -1.1  7.7  -5.2 
Firm entry  3.6  3.3  3.3  3.2  4.2  1.1  1.4  0.5 
Ongoing firms  27.7  21.8  37.2  9.0  -9.2  9.1  12.5  5.5 
Firm exit  -8.2  -11.3  -19.0  -11.3  -8.5  -11.4  -6.2  -11.2 
Domestic firm  16.7  15.4  19.7  3.1  0.4  -1.0  6.1  -2.8 
Firm entry  3.6  3.2  3.3  3.2  4.2  0.7  1.4  0.3 
Ongoing firms  20.0  22.3  25.0  8.5  4.2  5.6  8.6  5.5 
Firm exit  -6.8  -10.2  -8.5  -8.6  -8.0  -7.3  -4.0  -8.6 
Belgian MNF  0.3  -2.3  -7.6  -2.9  -4.1  3.7  -2.4  -1.2 
Firm entry       
Ongoing firms  0.6  -2.1  2.2  -1.3  -4.0  3.7  -1.7  -0.7 
Firm exit  -0.3  -0.2  -9.8  -1.6  -0.1  0.0  -0.7  -0.5 
Foreign MNF  6.1  0.7  9.3  0.7  -9.9  -3.8  4.0  -1.2 
Firm entry  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2 
Ongoing firms  7.1  1.6  10.0  1.8  -9.4  -0.2  5.5  0.7 
Firm exit  -1.1  -0.9  -0.7  -1.1  -0.5  -4.0  -1.5  -2.1 
 
b. Average net employment flows (in units) 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
All firms  2.1  1.2  1.9  0.1  -1.3  -0.1  0.7  -0.5 
New firm  37.4  45.3  43.1  46.2  97.1  48.5  90.6  47.3 
Ongoing firm  2.5  2.0  3.4  0.8  -0.9  0.9  1.2  0.5 
Closing firm  -56.9  -60.6  -101.8  -50.6  -42.2  -66.4  -38.9  -51.9 
Domestic firm  1.7  1.6  2.0  0.3  0.0  -0.1  0.7  -0.3 
New firm  37.5  44.9  43.5  46.4  97.1  35.0  90.6  30.9 
Ongoing firm  2.1  2.3  2.6  0.9  0.5  0.6  1.0  0.6 
Closing firm  -51.1  -58.9  -48.5  -42.5  -42.3  -48.3  -28.0  -44.7 
Belgian MNF  0.9  -6.6  -22.3  -6.7  -9.5  8.9  -5.9  -3.5 
New firm       
Ongoing firm  1.8  -6.2  6.5  -3.0  -9.4  9.1  -4.1  -2.1 
Closing  firm  -109.0  -78.5  -2438.3  -233.1  -33.5  -23.5  -352.5  -122.0 
Foreign MNF  6.2  0.8  8.8  0.5  -7.1  -2.6  2.9  -0.9 
New firm  29.0  72.0  17.0  26.0  138.7  195.0 
Ongoing firm  7.4  1.6  9.6  1.3  -6.8  -0.2  3.9  0.6 
Closing  firm  -132.5  -83.5  -105.7  -78.1  -42.1  -223.1  -112.0  -111.2 
Note: The decomposition exercise is performed only up to 2005 as firm exits are defined only over the 1997-2005 period.. 
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Table B.2 - Net employment flows of blue-collar workers 
 
a. Total employment flows (in thousands)  
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total  9.7  3.0  15.0  -6.3  -10.0  0.4  4.2  -5.7 
Firm entry  2.1  1.7  1.8  0.5  1.9  0.7  0.5  0.3 
Ongoing firms  11.7  7.4  19.5  -0.7  -7.8  5.6  6.5  -0.7 
Firm exit  -4.1  -6.0  -6.3  -6.1  -4.1  -5.9  -2.8  -5.4 
Domestic firm  7.6  5.0  10.5  -1.1  -2.4  0.4  2.4  -2.1 
Firm entry  2.1  1.6  1.8  0.5  1.9  0.4  0.5  0.1 
Ongoing firms  9.1  9.0  12.5  3.0  -0.5  3.9  3.6  1.9 
Firm exit  -3.7  -5.7  -3.7  -4.6  -3.8  -3.8  -1.7  -4.2 
Belgian MNF  -0.4  -0.7  -1.1  -1.7  -0.2  1.1  -1.7  -1.3 
Firm entry       
Ongoing firms  -0.1  -0.6  1.3  -0.5  -0.2  1.1  -1.1  -1.0 
Firm exit  -0.2  -0.1  -2.4  -1.2  0.0  0.0  -0.6  -0.3 
Foreign MNF  2.5  -1.2  5.5  -3.4  -7.3  -1.2  3.5  -2.3 
Firm entry  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1 
Ongoing firms  2.6  -1.0  5.7  -3.1  -7.1  0.6  4.0  -1.6 
Firm exit  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -2.1  -0.6  -0.9 
 
b. Average net employment flows (in units) 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
All firms  0.9  0.3  1.3  -0.6  -0.9  0.0  0.4  -0.6 
New firm  21.8  22.8  23.2  7.7  43.9  28.7  33.2  27.4 
Ongoing firm  1.1  0.7  1.8  -0.1  -0.7  0.5  0.6  -0.1 
Closing firm  -28.1  -32.4  -33.8  -27.4  -20.1  -34.6  -17.4  -24.8 
Domestic firm  0.8  0.5  1.1  -0.1  -0.3  0.0  0.3  -0.2 
New firm  21.9  22.3  23.3  7.5  43.9  18.2  33.2  15.7 
Ongoing firm  1.0  0.9  1.3  0.3  -0.1  0.4  0.4  0.2 
Closing firm  -27.5  -32.7  -21.2  -22.6  -20.3  -25.3  -11.5  -21.8 
Belgian MNF  -1.0  -2.1  -3.2  -4.0  -0.5  2.6  -4.2  -3.7 
New firm       
Ongoing firm  -0.3  -1.8  3.8  -1.2  -0.5  2.7  -2.8  -3.0 
Closing firm  -80.7  -54.5  -589.3  -175.3  -5.0  -15.0  -278.0  -70.8 
Foreign MNF  2.6  -1.2  5.3  -2.6  -5.3  -0.8  2.5  -1.8 
New firm  8.0  56.0  14.0  17.0  99.0  133.0 
Ongoing firm  2.7  -1.0  5.5  -2.4  -5.2  0.4  2.9  -1.2 
Closing firm  -19.4  -23.3  -32.1  -22.4  -19.2  -114.8  -42.9  -45.8 
. 
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Table B.3 - Net employment flows of white-collar workers 
 
a. Total employment flows (in thousands)  
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total  13.4  10.8  6.5  7.1  -3.6  -1.5  3.5  0.5 
Firm entry  1.5  1.6  1.5  2.7  2.3  0.5  0.9  0.2 
Ongoing firms  16.1  14.4  17.7  9.6  -1.5  3.5  6.0  6.2 
Firm exit  -4.1  -5.2  -12.7  -5.2  -4.5  -5.4  -3.4  -5.9 
Domestic firm  9.2  10.4  9.2  4.1  2.8  -1.4  3.6  -0.7 
Firm entry  1.5  1.6  1.5  2.7  2.3  0.3  0.9  0.1 
Ongoing firms  10.8  13.3  12.5  5.5  4.7  1.7  5.1  3.6 
Firm exit  -3.1  -4.5  -4.8  -4.0  -4.2  -3.5  -2.4  -4.4 
Belgian MNF  0.7  -1.6  -6.5  -1.2  -3.9  2.6  -0.7  0.1 
Firm entry       
Ongoing firms  0.8  -1.5  0.9  -0.7  -3.8  2.6  -0.5  0.3 
Firm exit  -0.1  0.0  -7.4  -0.4  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.2 
Foreign MNF  3.6  1.9  3.7  4.1  -2.6  -2.7  0.5  1.1 
Firm entry  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Ongoing firms  4.5  2.6  4.2  4.9  -2.3  -0.8  1.4  2.3 
Firm exit  -0.9  -0.7  -0.5  -0.8  -0.3  -1.9  -0.9  -1.2 
 
b. Average net employment flows (in units) 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
All firms  1.2  1.0  0.6  0.6  -0.3  -0.1  0.3  0.0 
New firm  15.7  22.5  20.0  38.5  53.2  19.8  57.4  19.9 
Ongoing firm  1.5  1.3  1.6  0.9  -0.1  0.3  0.6  0.6 
Closing firm  -28.7  -28.2  -68.0  -23.3  -22.1  -31.8  -21.5  -27.2 
Domestic firm  0.9  1.1  0.9  0.4  0.3  -0.2  0.4  -0.1 
New firm  15.6  22.6  20.2  38.9  53.2  16.8  57.4  15.2 
Ongoing firm  1.1  1.4  1.3  0.6  0.5  0.2  0.6  0.4 
Closing firm  -23.7  -26.2  -27.3  -19.8  -22.0  -23.0  -16.4  -22.9 
Belgian MNF  1.9  -4.5  -19.1  -2.7  -9.0  6.3  -1.7  0.2 
New firm       
Ongoing firm  2.1  -4.4  2.7  -1.8  -8.9  6.3  -1.3  0.8 
Closing firm  -28.3  -24.0  -1849.0  -57.9  -28.5  -8.5  -74.5  -51.3 
Foreign MNF  3.7  2.0  3.6  3.1  -1.9  -1.8  0.4  0.9 
New firm  21.0  16.0  3.0  9.0  39.7  62.0 
Ongoing firm  4.6  2.7  4.1  3.7  -1.7  -0.6  1.0  1.8 
Closing  firm  -113.1  -60.2  -73.6  -55.7  -22.9  -108.2  -69.1  -65.4 
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Appendix C. Estimates of production function coefficients 
 
  Estimates are based on the trimmed sample as explained in Appendix A. Table C.1 reports the 
number of observations and firms in the sample used to estimate production function coefficients. 
Table C.2 and C.3. report estimates of production coefficients, based on alternative procedures. 
Table C.2 reports estimates using the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure with alternative 
assumptions on labour flexibility. The first column reports our preferred specification. The estimates 
are based on the assumption that labour inputs do not fully adjust to current productivity shocks, 
consistently with our assumption of labour adjustment costs. The second column partly relaxes this 
assumption, allowing for blue-collar workers to adjust to current productivity shocks. The third 
column allows the employment of both blue-collar workers and white-collar workers to be flexible. 
We estimate standard errors using a bootstrap procedure. 
  Table C.3 compares our preferred estimates based on the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure, 
with those obtained using the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methods. 
In the Olley-Pakes (1996) procedure a polynomial function of investment and capital is used to 
proxy for productivity. In the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach, intermediate inputs are used in 
place of investment. In both cases, we control for survival bias, along the lines of Olley and 
Pakes (1996), and include year dummies. 
 
Table C.1. Number of observations and firms in the base sample 
Sector  # of obs.  # of firms 
(1) Food and textiles  6449  918 
(2) Wood, paper, chemicals, metal and non-metal products, machinery  14316  2013 
(3) Equipment and recycling  3750  554 
(4) Energy and construction  5913  871 
(5) Trade and hotels and restaurants  20985  3254 
(6) Communication and financial intermediation  5341  876 
(7) Real estate and business activities  1840  308 




  Table C.2. Estimates of production coefficients using alternative procedures 
 
ACF  ACF  ACF 
   K, L
B and L
W fixed  K and L
W fixed, L













1  0.178  0.424  0.388  0.120  0.664  0.350  0.138  0.569  0.351 
0.011  0.015  0.016  0.033  0.168  0.037  0.053  0.249  0.246 
2  0.161  0.358  0.437  0.154  0.387  0.431  0.166  0.367  0.257 
0.006  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.040  0.012  0.024  0.080  0.243 
3  0.138  0.354  0.433  0.102  0.637  0.406  0.119  0.643  0.242 
0.011  0.013  0.018  0.040  0.243  0.061  0.037  0.225  0.160 
4  0.106  0.502  0.338  0.097  0.532  0.331  0.089  0.592  0.305 
0.007  0.007  0.006  0.010  0.056  0.017  0.015  0.203  0.145 
5  0.126  0.176  0.561  0.120  0.208  0.560  0.138  0.167  0.422 
0.005  0.005  0.008  0.009  0.042  0.009  0.037  0.083  0.264 
6  0.163  0.268  0.361  0.159  0.257  0.356  0.164  0.238  0.272 
0.005  0.006  0.007  0.012  0.170  0.024  0.018  0.078  0.153 
7  0.179  0.071  0.612  0.173  0.101  0.618  0.188  0.105  0.408 
   0.013  0.018  0.034  0.016  0.052  0.039  0.047  0.089  0.261 
Note: Final sample on 1997-2005; 58594 observations and 8688 firms, standard errors in bracket. 
K stands for the capital stock, L
B for the number of blue-collar workers, L
W for the number of white-collar workers. 
ACF stands for Ackerberg et al. (2006), mean values and standard errors of the bootstrap estimates 
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Table C.3. Estimates of production coefficients using alternative procedures 











1  0.178  0.424  0.388  0.130  0.341  0.282  0.114  0.344  0.279 
0.011  0.015  0.016  0.020  0.007  0.007  0.018  0.007  0.007 
2  0.161  0.358  0.437  0.077  0.310  0.312  0.083  0.319  0.315 
0.006  0.009  0.009  0.012  0.004  0.004  0.011  0.004  0.004 
3  0.138  0.354  0.433  0.110  0.333  0.347  0.115  0.346  0.358 
0.011  0.013  0.018  0.026  0.009  0.008  0.019  0.008  0.008 
4  0.106  0.502  0.338  0.048  0.428  0.274  0.051  0.430  0.267 
0.007  0.007  0.006  0.015  0.006  0.006  0.011  0.006  0.006 
5  0.126  0.176  0.561  0.059  0.145  0.437  0.077  0.149  0.439 
0.005  0.005  0.008  0.012  0.003  0.004  0.009  0.003  0.004 
6  0.163  0.268  0.361  0.091  0.224  0.323  0.099  0.235  0.314 
0.005  0.006  0.007  0.021  0.007  0.008  0.017  0.006  0.007 
7  0.179  0.071  0.612  0.089  0.030  0.426  0.109  0.044  0.432 
   0.013  0.018  0.034  0.032  0.011  0.015  0.027  0.010  0.014 
Note: Final sample on 1997-2005; 58594 observations and 8688 firms, standard errors in bracket. 
K stands for the capital stock, L
B for the number of blue-collar workers, L
W for the number of white-collar workers. 
ACF stands for Ackerberg et al. (2006), OP for Olley and Pakes (1996) and LP for Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For the 
ACF procedure, the table reports the mean values and the standard errors of the bootstrap estimates, assuming K, L
B and 
L
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